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In this paper, we try to determine the effect of the presence of 
family shareholders on company performance in the absence of ex- 
ternal corporate governance. Our empirical results using Anderson et 
al. (2009, 2012)’s family firm data suggests that family firms exhibit 
superior firm performance relative to nonfamily firms when the level 
of product market competition is weak, suggesting that the family 
control is an effective internal corporate governance mechanism that can 
compensate for weak external corporate governance. Furthermore, a 
family firm’s performance results in being superior to nonfamily firms’ 
performance in weak competitive markets, regardless of whether the 
CEO of a family firm is a founder, heir or professional manager. These 
findings suggest that the family control is an effective organizational 
structure in mitigating agency problems and enhancing firm perform- 
ance when external corporate governance is weak.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Family control, Product market 
competition, Agency problem, Firm performance 
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I. Introduction
Most previous studies have reported both positive and negative influ- 
ences of family control on firm performance. While studies showing 
evidence of positive influences assert that family ownership actually 
reduces the agency problem, due to the alignment of ownership and 
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management (Anderson, and Reeb 2003), studies showing evidence of 
negative influences argue that the interests of controlling family share- 
holders infringe on the interests of minority shareholders (Holderness, 
and Sheehan 1988). Little research has been conducted on the associ- 
ation between external corporate governance and internal corporate gov- 
ernance, however, especially on the relation between product market 
competition and family control. Therefore, in this study we examine the 
effect of internal corporate governance on the agency problem, which 
has been found to be more severe when external corporate governance 
is weaker.
The effect of internal control on operating and stock market performance 
depends on the level of product market competition. In a similar study 
by Januszewski et al. (2002), Nickell et al. (1997) and Koke, and 
Renneboog (2005), the impact of corporate control (namely blockholder 
ownership) and product market competition on productivity growth is 
examined. Specifically, Januszewski et al. (2002) show that in the case 
of German manufacturers, the productivity growth seems to be higher 
when operating in markets with intense competition. In addition, a 
positive effect of competition increases even more so when strong ul- 
timate owners (i.e., private individuals, government authorities) are in 
place, suggesting that competition and tight control are complementary. 
On the other hand, Nickell et al. (1997) and Koke, and Renneboog 
(2005) suggest that product market competition and insider control are 
substitute mechanisms. Specifically, Nickell et al. (1997) indicate that 
in the case of UK manufacturing companies, strong ownership (the largest 
shareholders were insurance companies, pension funds or banks in this 
case) and product market competition are substitutes, each increasing the 
productivity. Koke, and Renneboog (2005) suggest that weak product 
market competition has a negative impact on productivity growth in 
both UK and German markets. For UK firms, however, it reports that a 
negative effect on weak product market competition is mitigated in firms 
with a large portion of insider control (directors and their families).  
With these past studies in mind, the differentiating points of this study 
are as follows: First, this study focuses on controlling family shareholders 
whose characteristics are quite different from general large shareholders. 
Second, we study the family control variable in depth by analyzing the 
different impacts generated by different types of CEOs within the family 
firms when compared with nonfamily firms, further developing the results 
of preceding studies. 
One of the defining characteristics of public companies in the US is 
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the separation of management and ownership. This separation, however, 
can cause agency problems between managers and outside shareholders 
(Demsetz, and Lehn 1985; Jensen, and Meckling 1976; Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1997), and such agency problems can be even more severe for 
firms with weak external monitoring systems on management. Unlike 
firms with dispersed shareholders, however, undiversified investment by 
family members is characteristic of family controlled firms. Family share- 
holders consider these long-term investments as a way of connecting 
multiple generations, and value the reputation of the family firm 
(Anderson, and Reeb 2003; Anderson et al. 2002; Demsetz, and Lehn 
1985; Steier 2001). Thus, the characteristics of family firms are quite 
different from those of conventional firms with general large share- 
holders. Family members often occupy important management positions 
and have considerable influence and control.1 In fact, a more effective 
control of management may occur in family-controlled firms due to tight 
monitoring of daily operations, reliance on the family directors’ business 
knowledge, and the advantage of their lengthy tenure in the business. 
Thus, we hypothesize that the benefits of having family control within 
firms to be greater than in general large shareholder firms, where we 
suspect monitoring of management by external corporate governance is 
poor. 
On the contrary, it is also possible that the lack of market monitoring 
and external control may have a detrimental effect on family-controlled 
firms. Uncontested power of controlling owners and weak check-and- 
balance systems may create an entrenchment problem in which the 
controlling owners have too much freedom to extract wealth from out- 
side shareholders. This tendency is even more pronounced when both 
the market pressure and the internal mechanism for monitoring and 
restraining the controlling owners are weak. Under these circumstances, 
the impact of family control on firm performance can be negative. 
To address this issue, we utilized the publicly disclosed family firm 
data, which is a combined and augmented sample from Anderson et al. 
(2009, 2012). The data in this sample uses the 2,000 largest firms in 
terms of total assets from the years 2001 to 2010. The family firms 
defined in the sample are those in which the founder or founders’ heirs 
1 According to Shleifer, and Vishny (1986), family firms, which account for 
33% of the Fortune 500 companies, are usually run by large shareholders. The 
share distribution is not highly segmented; usually a few large shareholders are 
founding members and are represented on the board of directors.
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maintain an equity position, serve on the board, or serve as a top-level 
manager. To measure the founder or heir presence, Anderson places no 
minimum ownership on threshold (Anderson et al., 2009).2
In aggregate, our empirical results suggest that family firms exhibit 
superior firm performance relative to nonfamily firms when the level of 
product market competition is weak. This suggests that the family con- 
trol is an effective internal corporate governance mechanism that can 
compensate for weak external corporate governance. Yet, previous studies 
(Wang 2006; Chen et al. 2010; Ali et al. 2007; Anderson, and Reeb 
2003; Anderson et al. 2009) show that firm performances differ depen- 
ding on whether the CEO is a founder, an heir or an outside hire. 
Therefore, our analysis also investigates the influence of a family member 
acting as the CEO3 on a family firm’s performance in the absence of 
market pressure. Interestingly, irrespective of whether the CEO is a 
founder, a heir or hire, when compared to nonfamily firms, we found 
that continued family presence (maintaining influence in the firm pri- 
marily through an equity stake or as a top-level manager) generates 
significantly better accounting and stock market performance under 
weak product market competition.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews previous literature 
and develops the hypotheses, Section III describes the data and research 
design, Section IV provides summary statistics and summarizes the em- 
pirical results of this study on the effect of family control on firm per- 
formance in noncompetitive industries and finally, Section V concludes 
the paper.
　
II. Literature Review & Hypothesis Development
A. Product-Market Competition
Most studies on corporate governance have focused on mechanisms 
to mitigate the agency problem (Bushman, and Smith 2003). Franks, 
2 For robustness test, they use the fractional level of founder or heir owner- 
ship, and the results are robust to using a dummy variable at the 1% level and 
5% level to denote founder or heir firms. Therefore, the results of our study 
using their family firm variables too are determined to be robust as well in terms 
of family-firm variable definition.
3 In order to distinguish CEO classification we manually collect data from cor- 
porate proxy statements from 2001 to 2010 since Anderson et al. (2009, 2012) 
disclose only a dummy variable that equals one when firms are family controlled, 
and zero otherwise. 
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and Mayer (1996, 2001) categorize corporate control mechanisms into 
external and internal. To qualify as an internal mechanism, controlling 
shareholders and the board must play an important role in internal 
controls, while in an external mechanism, firm managers are given in- 
centives to motivate them to align themselves with shareholders’ interests 
according to various external pressures, such as hostile takeovers and 
product market competition. 
One of the most frequently discussed external mechanisms is corporate 
takeover. One of the major characteristics of a takeover is being period 
specific (Holmstrom, and Kaplan 2001), suggesting that takeovers have 
a disciplinary function when the internal governance mechanism is 
weak (Kini et al. 2004). For example, low-performing managers become 
acquired or fired (Martin, and McConnel 1991; Huson et al., 2001) and 
have difficulty moving to a higher position (Agrawal, and Walkling 1994). 
Furthermore, Mikkelson, and Partch (1997), Denis et al. (2000) find 
that CEO turnovers are more frequent in low-performance firms, and 
more restructuring activities occur during the active period of takeovers 
relative to less active periods. These results suggest that in general, 
takeover activities decrease the principal-agent conflicts both in target 
and non-target firms.  
Another external mechanism is product market competition, and this 
is the main focus of this study. Gilson, and Roe (1993) describe intense 
product market competition as the most elegant monitoring mechanism. 
They state that product market competition, which increases the risk of 
bankruptcy, can motivate firms to perform better and to monitor each 
other’s performance. Holmstrom, and Tirole (1993) show that product 
market competition forces managers to discipline themselves for optimal 
performance, since complete information on company expenses is made 
available to the public in a perfectly competitive market. Hart (1983) 
presents theoretical models proposing that product market competition 
reduces managerial slack with an optimally chosen managerial incentive 
scheme. Hart’s study also suggests, however, that there could still be 
managerial slack with optimal incentive scheme when a firm’s cost is so 
low that the manager can still achieve the income target even if he or 
she takes on a discretionary behavior for his or her own benefit.  
Nickell (1996) and Griffith (2001) document a positive association 
between intensified product market competition and productivity growth. 
In a study of the banking industry, Berger, and Hannan (1998) show 
that increasing market competition increases cost efficiency. Previous 
studies (Januszewski et al. 2002; Nickell et al. 1997; Koke, and Renneboog, 
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2005) provide evidence that an internal corporate governance mechanism 
can complement (or substitute for) product market competition. Koke, 
and Renneboog (2005) prove that weaker product market competition 
has a negative effect on productivity. In a developed capital market 
such as that in England, however, having insider control (directors and 
their families) improves productivity under conditions of weak product 
market competition. Koke and Renneboog’s study does not directly deal 
with the controlling family shareholders, however.   
Giroud, and Mueller (2011) report that poor corporate governance re- 
sults in lower equity returns, poorer operating performance, and reduced 
firm value; however, these negative results are evident only in noncom- 
petitive industries. They explain that managers maximize corporate per- 
formance through self-discipline under conditions of fierce product market 
competition. Randoy, and Jenssen (2004) and Li, and Niu (2006) also 
examine the interaction between internal corporate governance and pro- 
duct market competition. These studies document that increasing the 
proportion of independent directors on the board decreases firm value 
in a highly competitive product market, suggesting that additional mon- 
itoring by independent directors may be costly under conditions of effi- 
cient market monitoring. 
　
B. Family Governance and Firm Performance
Family ownership is an important form of corporate ownership structure, 
and a high proportion of companies around the world are family con- 
trolled (Burkart et al. 2003). Shleifer, and Vishny (1986) report that 
33% (149/456) of firms in a sample of Fortune 500 corporations in 1980 
have family members represented on the board of directors. In addition, 
Anderson, and Reeb (2003) identify members of founding families in 
33% of S&P 500 corporations listed from 1992 to 1999.  
According to a number of previous studies (Anderson, and Reeb 2003; 
Faccio, and Lang 2002; La Porta et al. 1999; Wang 2006; Barth et al. 
2005), a firm is a family firm if the founder’s family has a certain 
proportion of shares or participates in its management, though each 
study uses different percentages of shares as the benchmark. The effects 
of family governance on firm performance have been explained within 
an agency framework: the entrenchment hypothesis and the alignment 
hypothesis. The entrenchment hypothesis represents the traditional view, 
which focuses on the inefficiency of family controlled firms due to the 
fact that controlling owners have ultimate power to pursue their private 
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interests, exhibit opportunistic behaviors, and damage the interests of 
minority shareholders in order to maximize their own wealth (Fama, and 
Jensen 1983; Morck et al. 1988; Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; DeAngelo, 
and DeAngelo 2000; Burkart et al. 1997). This view says that in family 
controlled firms, the monitoring and controlling functions of the board 
of directors are undermined by family member’s interests, who may be 
dominating the board or hire directors to work for them and represent 
their interests, not those of outside shareholders. This kind of behavior 
tends to increases the possibility of wealth expropriation from those 
shareholders. 
On the other hand, by looking from the perspective of the agency 
problem between managers and controlling shareholders, Demsetz, and 
Lehn (1985) suggest that the economic motives of controlling shareholders 
may have positive effects on firm performance, because they are strongly 
inclined to reduce agency costs and maximize firm value. Therefore, the 
interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are better 
aligned in a centralized ownership structure, in which controlling share- 
holders effectively monitor the managers (the alignment hypothesis). The 
agency problem cannot on its own fully address the multifaceted realities 
inherent in family firms, however (Eisenhardt 1989). Generally, family 
shareholders and other large shareholders may seem similar in that 
they both have high equity ownerships, but family shareholders are dif- 
ferent as they are long-term investors, participate in management acti- 
vities and their shares consist of less-diversified holdings. More specifi- 
cally, founding families take on the role of stewards for their family 
firms to ensure the firm’s success in future generations. Hence, from 
the stewardship perspective, a family member’s objectives align with those 
of the firm, enabling them to free themselves from self-serving be- 
haviors and individualism, and instead focus on pro-organizational be- 
haviors as the firm’s steward (Moores 2009; Salvato, and Moores 2010; 
Prencipe et al. 2008, 2011; Cascino et al. 2010). These studies cited in 
the previous sentence all state that agency and stewardship theories 
are both necessary in order to understand family firms, and that these 
theories serve as a complement to each other. 
Consequently, the operating and stock market performance of family 
firms can go in two distinct directions. Corporate performance can be 
hurt by the decisions of controlling shareholders to maximize the family’s 
private interests, or corporate performance can be improved by the align- 
ment of the economic motives of controlling family shareholders and 
the interests of minority shareholders.
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C. Hypothesis Development
Most previous studies have focused on the role and efficiency of 
corporate governance. Little research has been conducted on the role of 
family firms in the absence of external corporate governance, however. 
Therefore, this paper will examine the effect of the presence of family 
shareholders on firm performance under conditions of low pressure from 
product market competition. If the level of competition in the product 
market is low, the market’s monitoring function and control over man- 
agers becomes weak, resulting in an agency problem between managers 
and shareholders, which in turn negatively affects corporate performance. 
In the meantime, from the perspective of agency theory, the interests 
of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are better aligned 
in a centralized ownership structure, in which controlling shareholders 
effectively monitor the managers. In addition if a situation is analyzed 
from the stewardship perspective, founding families take on the role of 
stewards for their family firms to ensure the firm’s success in future 
generations. Hence, economic motives of family shareholders may have 
positive effects on firm performance, as they are strongly inclined to 
reduce agency costs and maximize firm value. The benefits will be even 
greater when the control of external corporate governance is lacking. 
Therefore, this paper is predicting that the agency problem caused by 
weak external corporate governance is mitigated by efficient internal 
corporate governance in family controlled firms.
In contrast, family shareholders may pursue private interests more 
easily when the external monitoring mechanism is weak, and the en- 
trenchment of external shareholders’ interests may become more serious. 
This occurs in family firms where the internal corporate governance 
mechanism for monitoring and controlling insiders’ pursuit of private 
interests is weak. In this sense, the impact on firm performance in firms 
with family control may be either positive or negative in noncompetitive 
industries, which becomes an empirical issue. Furthermore, anecdotal 
evidences4 and prior literatures (Wang 2006; Chen et al. 2010; Ali et al. 
2007; Anderson, and Reeb 2003; Anderson et al. 2009) suggest that 
there exists differential performance in family firms based on the CEO 
status. In order to distinguish CEO classification,5 we manually collected 
4 For example, CEO of Hewlett-Packard recently noted, founding families have 
concerns and interests of their own, such as stability and capital preservation, 
that may not align with the interests of other investors or their firm (Anderson, 
and Reeb 2003).
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data from corporate proxy statements from 2001 to 2010, and de- 
lineated three CEO types in family firms: founder CEO, heir CEO, and 
professional manager or an outside hire CEO. This analysis also inves- 
tigates the influence of a family member acting as the CEO on a family 
firm’s performance in the absence of market pressure.
Family CEOs can further strengthen a family’s degree of control, and 
the CEOs that are a member of the family can have a positive or a 
negative impact on their firms depending on their motives. As previous 
studies mention (DeAngelo, and DeAngelo 2000; Labatkin et al. 2007; 
Schulze et al. 2001, 2002, 2003), if given the uncontestable power 
within the firm, family CEOs can entrench themselves and extract 
private benefits of control, thus granting them greater ease in extracting 
firm resources at the minority shareholders’ expense. In other worries, 
they have the potential to lead to competitive disadvantages, as they 
tend to be against recruiting outside personnel though they may be 
competent and qualified to run the firm (Morck et al. 2000; Schulze et 
al. 2001). Preceding studies suggest that because of these issues 
regarding succession of management control, heir controlled family firms 
have greater negative firm performances than those that are founder 
controlled (Villalonga, and Amit 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2006; Perez- 
Gonzalez 2006; Morck, and Yeung 2003). 
In this sense, when the CEO of a firm is a family member, the ability 
or potential for the family CEO to obtain private rentals is even greater 
when external monitoring is not in place. These kinds of actions can 
lead to poor firm performance relative to nonfamily firms. Another factor 
leading to potentially low performance is the problem of entrenchment 
in heir controlled firms, as an heir might be less competent, able or 
committed to the firm than the founder (Morck, and Yeung 2003; Perez- 
Gonzalez 2006).6
Those suggesting positive influence of family members in firms, how- 
ever, insist that when family members participate in management acti- 
5 Anderson et al. (2009, 2012) provide only a dummy variable that equals one 
when firms are family controlled and zero otherwise. That is, because they do 
not provide any of characteristics of family firms, such as ownership information 
and classification as founder or heir, we manually collected the data from the 
corporate proxy statement.
6 Schulze et al. (2001) state that appointing a family CEO without experience 
and knowledge often cause nonfamily executives to be unhappy, and this dark 
side of altruism, in which parents are compelled to be generous to their kin 
(Lubatkin et al. 2007), usually affects a firm negatively.
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vities, the “No Absentee Landlords” (Weber et al. 2003; Wang 2006) 
approach is likely to create a strong monitoring mechanism that leads 
to responsible management for all shareholders and decreases self-serving 
or myopic behavior on the part of managers.7 Therefore, the monitoring 
and control by family CEOs are a powerful and efficient internal gov- 
ernance mechanism, which could replace external monitoring and could 
even result in superior firm performance compared to those of non- 
family firms. 
Consequently, this paper investigates whether a family firm exhibits 
differential operating and stock market performance relative to nonfamily 
firms in the absence of external corporate governance. We further 
examine the impact of family members actively taking control of firm 
management as CEOs. Therefore we posit the following hypotheses:
   
Hypothesis 1
The level of product market competition has different effects on operating 
performance in family firms (controlled by founder CEO, heir CEO, or profes- 
sional CEO) and nonfamily firms.
Hypothesis 2
The level of product market competition has different effects on stock market 
performance in family firms (controlled by founder CEO, heir CEO, or profes- 
sional CEO) and nonfamily firms.
III. Sample Selection & Research Design
　
A. Sample Selection
We used the family ownership data for the Top 2,000 largest firms 
from 2001 to 2010, and the data in this study is a combined and 
augmented sample from Anderson et al. (2009, 2012).8 Firm-specific 
data is drawn from COMPUSTAT. Financial firms (SIC codes 6020 
through 6799) and regulated public utilities (SIC codes 4911 through 
4991) are excluded, as they are subject to different government and 
7 Stewardship theory, developed by Donaldson, and Davis (1991, 1993), is a 
new perspective on understanding the existing relationships between the ownership 
and management of a company.
8 In their study, the family firms are those in which the founder or founders’ 
heirs maintain an equity position, serve on the board, or serve as a top level 
manager. To measure the founder or heir presence, they place no minimum 
ownership threshold following Anderson et al. (2009, 2012).
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Sample Selection Number of firm-years
Family Ownership Data for the Top-2,000 Largest 
Firms for 2001 and spans from 2001 through 2010 
(provided by Anderson et al., 2009, 2012)
　Less  　industries with less than five firms per 
two-digit SIC

















accounting regulations from those of other firms. In addition, firms with 
negative equity are also eliminated in order to prevent distortions 
caused by financial distress. In order to control for the possible effect of 
outliers while maintaining the sample size, continuous variables used 
in our study are winsorized, or limiting the extreme values, at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles.  
As shown in Table 1, our final sample consists of 10,637 firm-year 
observations, where 28% (n＝2,994) of them are family firms, 16% (n＝
1,666) of them have family CEOs, 7% (n＝787) of them have founder 
CEOs, 8% (n＝879) of them have heir CEOs and lastly 12% (n＝1,328) 
of them have professional CEOs. Table 2 shows the sample distribution 
by industry. Family firms are evenly distributed among the two-digit 
Standard Industry Codes (SIC).
B. Variables and Research Design
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is utilized to measure the level 
of product market competition, which is a commonly used measure in 
empirical industrial organization literature. Higher HHI values imply 
lower levels of product market competition. The HHI is calculated as 
the sum of squared market shares in a given year and industry, and 
the market share of a company is defined as the proportion of the 
company’s sales in a given industry year. To calculate HHI values, all 
available COMPUSTAT firms are included in industries with at least five 




































































Oil and gas extraction
Non metallic minerals, ecxcept fuels
General building contractors
Heavy construction, except building
Special trade contractors
Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textile products
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and misc. plastics products
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Leather and leather products
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Electronic & other electric equip.
Transportation equipment














Apparel and accessory stores
Furniture and home furnishings 
Eating and drinking places
Miscellaneous retail
Hotels and other lodging places
Personal services
Business services
Auto repair, services, and parking
Motion pictures











































































































































































Sum  7,643 2,994 28%
Note: Numbers and percentages of firms by two-digit SIC. Percent of family firms in each 
industry is computed as the number of family firms divided by the total number of firms.
TABLE 2 
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY INDUSTRY
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firms per two-digit SIC.    
For robustness checks, we used two alternative measures to proxy for 
product market competition: (1) four-firm concentration ratio,9 which is 
the sum of market shares of the four largest firms in an industry, and 
(2) HHI using three-digit SIC industries. Similar results were obtained 
using two of these alternative and competitive measures, and the 
results are displayed in Table 6.   
There are four different variables representing family control: (1) FAM 
is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the firm in question 
is a family firm and 0 otherwise; (2) Founder CEO is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the founder holds the CEO position; (3) 
Heir CEO is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if an heir 
holds the CEO position; (4) Professional CEO is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if a professional holds the CEO position in 
a family firm.
The dependent variable for operating performance in this investigation 
is return on assets (ROA). ROA is computed in two ways: (1) by using 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) 
scaled by the book value of average total assets (ROA1) and (2) by using 
net income divided by the book value of average total assets (ROA2). As 
for the stock market performance, we used both measures of Tobin’s Q 
(TQ) and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). Tobin’s Q is the market value 
of total assets (total assets― book value of equity + market value of 
equity) divided by the book value of total assets. The market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) is the market value of equity (common stock × fiscal 
year-end stock price) divided by the book value of equity.
Our interest variable is the interaction between FAM (Founder CEO, 
Heir CEO, Professional CEO) and HHI. For example, FAM × HHI in this 
model indicates the effect of family control on firm operating and stock 
market performance depending on the level of product market competi- 
tion. Other variables, such as family firm characteristics suggested by 
Anderson, and Reeb (2003), are added as controls to adjust for con- 
founding effects on firm performance (either operating or stock market 
performance). Since we are analyzing the effects of product market 
competition on current year’s performance, we use the control variables 
9 HHI and ‘four-firm concentration ratio’ are common in the empirical indus- 
trial organization literature and is routinely used by government agencies (Giroud, 
and Mueller 2011). In addition, HHI is well grounded in theory (see Tirole 1988, 
pp.221-3).
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of the preceding year (t－1) to avoid endogeneity.10 Firm size (SIZE) is 
the natural log of the market value of equity. The leverage ratio (LEV) is 
the long-term debt to equity, and firm age (AGE) is measured as the 
natural log of the number of years since the company first appeared in 
COMPUSTAT. We also control for CEO equity-based pay (OPTION) be- 
cause of the relation between executive pay and firm performance. The 
measure OPTION is calculated as the option value divided by the total 
compensation, including equity-based pay, salary, and annual bonus. 
Compensation data is drawn from S&P’s COMPUEXEC. GPM is in- 
cluded to control for the operating profit. It is measured as gross profit 
to sales. And the dummy variables for year (YRD) and industry (IND) 
based on first-digit SIC are included. 
Finally, the following equations are utilized to investigate the effect of 
family control on a firm’s operating and stock market performance 
(Equation (1) and (2), respectively) in relation to the level of product 
market competition.
　
α β β β β
β β β β β ε
− − −
− − −
= + + + × +
+ + + + + +
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
ROA FAM HHI FAM HHI SIZE
LEV AGE OPTION YRD IND  
(1)
α β β β β
β β β β
β β ε
− − −
− − − −
= + + + × +
+ + + +
+ + +
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1
( )i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
TQ MTB FAM HHI FAM HHI SIZE
LEV AGE OPTION GPM
YRD IND  
(2)
　
IV. Results of Empirical Analysis
　
A. Descriptive Statistics & Correlation Analysis
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among the 
variables used in this study. While Panel A presents the descriptive 
statistics of the full sample, Panel B provides the results of the means 
and median tests of the sample by family firms and nonfamily firms. 
In Panel A, the average degree of product market competition (HHI) 
for the year t－1 is 7.8% in this sample. The performance variables of 
10 However, the current-year(t) variable is applied for family control since it is 
determined to be more relevant to the purpose of this study to see the impact of 
the current year’s family control on the current year’s performance. But it is 
verified that the result of the regression analysis remains intact even when the 
t－1 family dummy variable is used.



































































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS





































































































Panel B: Differences of Means and Median Tests between Family Firms and 
Nonfamily Firms
ROA1 and ROA2 are 11.8% and 2.0%, respectively. In addition, values 
for the stock market performance measures TQ and MTB are 1.734 and 
2.814, respectively.  
In Panel B, the proportion of family firms is 28% amongst our sample, 
and the mean (median) value of HHI for family firms is significantly 
higher 8.1% (5.9%) compared to 7.6% (4.7%) for nonfamily firms at the 
1% level, implying that family firms are more distributed in noncompe- 
titive industries. In terms of operating performance, we find little dif- 
ference between family firms and nonfamily firms, with the exception of 
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Notes: Panels A, B, and C provide summary statistics and correlations for the data 
employed in our analysis. The data set is comprised of 10,637 firm-year observations 
from 2001 to 2010. FAM is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is a family 
firm. The HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) is calculated as the sum of squared 
market shares in a given industry year, and the market share of a company is the 
proportion of the company’s sales in a given industry year. ROA1 is earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to average the total assets. 
ROA2 uses net income to average total assets. TQ is calculated as the market value 
of assets (total assets―book value of equity＋market value of equity) divided by the 
book value of assets. MTB is the market value of equity to book value of equity. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity in year t－1. LEV is 
long-term debt to book value of equity in year t－1. AGE is the natural logarithm of 
the number of years since the company first appeared in COMPUSTAT in year t－1. 
OPTION is the option value divided by the total compensation, including equity-based 
pay, salary, and annual bonus in year t－1. GPM is operating profit calculated as 




Panel C: Pearson and Spearman Correlations (above/below the diagonal, 
respectively; p-values in parentheses)
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ROA2 (using net income as the numerator), which indicates that family 
firms are significantly better performers at the 1% level.
With the values for the measure of stock market performance (TQ 
and MTB) in mind, it is observed that family firms have significantly 
lower firm value than nonfamily firms. Therefore, the univariate evidence 
suggests that firm value of family firms is lower than nonfamily firms 
during the time period examined here, though the operating performance 
of family firms is significantly better in terms of ROA2.
With respect to the control variables for the year t－1, the results 
demonstrate that family firms are smaller in SIZE with younger ages 
(AGE), and have about 70.6% (32.1%) long-term debt (LEV) in their 
capital structures, versus 80.3% (39.6%) for nonfamily firms. The mean 
and median differences of those values between the two groups are all 
significantly different at the 1% level. Interestingly, it should also be 
noted that CEOs in family firms earn nearly 6% less of their total pay 
in equity-based forms compared to CEOs in nonfamily firms, which is 
similar to what Anderson, and Reeb (2003) found.
Panel C provides the correlation matrix of the variables in the sample. 
The upper diagonal shows the Pearson correlations and the lower diag- 
onal shows the Spearman correlations. The correlation coefficients are 
relatively small.11 Like the results of the difference of means (median) 
tests in Panel B, a positive correlation is observed between the family 
firm dummy (FAM) and HHI, as well as with ROA2, which implies family 
firms are distributed more in noncompetitive industries and have better 
operating performance there. On the other hand, we find that FAM is 
negatively correlated with the market value (TQ and MTB), suggesting 
lower stock market performance in family firms. The relation between 
family presence and firm performance can be seen in the following 
section after controlling for confounding factors.
   
V. Multivariate Analysis
A. Main Results
Table 4 consists of Panel A and Panel B. Panel A contains the result 
of the analysis on whether the performance of family firms, compared 
11 The correlation matrix for the sample reveals no correlation coefficients 
greater than a threshold of 0.5, as suggested by Neter et al. (1996). The variance 
inflation scores for all variables were ＜2 in the regression models, indicating no 
significant impact of collinearity among the variables in the regression.
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REGRESSION RESULTS FOR OPERATING AND STOCK MARKET PERFORMANCE
Panel A: Family Firms versus Nonfamily Firms
to nonfamily firms, differs depending on the level of market competition. 
Panel B-1 to B-4 contains further analysis on whether a family firm’s 
performances varies depending on the type of CEO hired. The table 
contains four columns, each of which displays a regression result. In 
columns (1) and (2) we provide the results using accounting performance 
measures (ROA1 and ROA2, respectively) as dependent variables, while 
stock market performance measures (TQ and MTB, respectively) are 
used as dependent variables in columns (3) and (4).12
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Panel B-1: Family Firms with Founder and Heir CEOs versus Nonfamily Firms
12 We present the main results using the ordinary least square (OLS) regres- 
sion in Table 4, and the p-values on the variables are two-tailed values cal- 
culated based on White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. In 
robustness checks, we also analyze alternative econometric techniques that con- 
trol for serial correlation. These techniques include: (a) Firm-level clustering re- 
gressions to adjust for standard errors if there is an autocorrelation at the firm 
level, and (b) Fama-MacBeth regressions. The results from the alternative regres- 
sion methods are similar to our main results and are shown in Table 7.
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Panel B-2: Family Firms with Founder CEOs versus Nonfamily Firms
In Panel A of Table 4, the coefficient estimates on the stand-alone 
family dummy variable (β1 FAM) in columns (1) and (2) are all positive 
and significant. On the other hand, in columns (3) and (4), which 
display the impact on stock market performance, the coefficients of FAM 
are all negative and significant above the 5% significance level. Such 
contrary evidence suggests that family firms are better in accounting 
performance, but not in market performance compared to nonfamily 
firms. This is generally consistent with the preceding studies on family 





































































































































Panel B-3: Family Firms with Heir CEOs versus Nonfamily Firms
firms. For example, Anderson, and Reeb (2003) show that family firms 
are superior when it comes to accounting profitability measures, but 
only those family firms with founder CEOs and outside (hired) CEOs 
demonstrate outstanding market performance. Those with heir CEOs do 
not perform better in the market, according to Anderson. Similarly, the 
Perez-Gonzalez (2006) study shows that stock return is negatively related 
to family heirs. Holderness, and Sheehan (1988), Morck et al. (2000) 
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Notes: This data set is comprised of 10,637 firm-year observations in the years 2001 and 2010. 
FAM equals one if the firm is a family firm. Family CEO equals one if the founder or heir 
holds the CEO position. Founder CEO equals one if the founder holds the CEO position. 
Heir CEO equals one if an heir holds the CEO position. Profession CEO equals one if a 
professional holds the CEO position in a family firm. The HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 
is calculated as the sum of squared market shares in a given industry year, and the market 
share of a company is the proportion of the company’s sales in a given industry year. ROA1 
is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) to average the total 
assets. ROA2 uses net income to average total assets. TQ is calculated as the market value 
of assets (total assets― book value of equity + market value of equity) divided by the book 
value of assets. MTB is the market value of equity to book value of equity. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of market value of equity in year t－1. LEV is the long-term debt to book 
value of equity in year t－1. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
company first appeared in COMPUSTAT in year tt－1. OPTION is the option value divided by 
the total compensation, including equity-based pay, salary, and annual bonus in year t－1. 
GPM is operating profit calculated as gross profit to sales. All regressions include dummy 
variables for one-digit SIC codes and for each year of the sample period. The coefficients on 
the industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. White (1980)-corrected t-values 




Panel B-4: Family Firms with Professional CEOs versus Nonfamily Firms
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report that family firms have relatively lower Tobin Qs than nonfamily 
firms. These results suggest that investors negatively perceive family 
firms management successions by the heirs. Therefore, this study ana- 
lyzes whether family firms operating and market stock performances 
vary depending on their CEO types through additional tests, and the 
results are in Panel B-1~B-4 of Table 4. 
In the meantime, the main interest of this study is not in the com- 
parison between family and nonfamily firms, but rather in the impact of 
product market competition on a family firm’s performance. Interestingly, 
the interaction between FAM and HHI (β3 FAM*HHI), which are the 
main focus of our study, indicate that as product market competition 
decreases, family firms appear to demonstrate better operating and stock 
market performances relative to nonfamily firms. 
From an economic perspective, for firms in the highest quintile of 
HHI (18.3%, a weakly competitive environment), family firms have more 
positive impact by 2.8% and 3.1% on operating profit (ROA1) and stock 
market performance (TQ), respectively, than nonfamily firms.13 Therefore, 
contrary to the concern that family influence harms firm performance 
and that such negative impact on performance might be exacerbated 
under a lack of market pressure, our evidence suggests that family firms 
perform better than nonfamily firms. Particularly, family firms in non- 
competitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms 
in competitive industries.
Panel B shows the result of the analysis comparing family firms cate- 
gorized by their CEO types to nonfamily firms. Firstly, in Panel B-1, we 
analyze the family firms in which the founder or heir serve as the firm’s 
CEOs against nonfamily firms. Family CEO × HHIt－1, is the variable of 
our interest in this panel, and positive coefficients are shown in all four 
models, suggesting that those family firms with family CEOs show su- 
perior operating and stock market performances to those of nonfamily 
firms under weak product market competition conditions. 
Panel B-2 and B-3 contain the results of the analysis in which family 
CEOs are further segregated as founder CEOs and heir CEOs. Panel 
B-2 shows that Founder CEO × HHIt－1 has positive coefficients in all 
four models, as expected, suggesting that family firms with founder 
CEOs are better performers as product market competition decreases. 
13 We calculate this as follows: 1) for operating performance (ROA1), β1FAM＋
β2HHI＋β3FAM*HHI＝0.005＋0.082*0.183+0.049*0.183; 2) for stock market per- 
formance (TQ), β1FAM＋β2HHI+β3FAM*HHI＝-0.068-0.982*0.183+1.532*0.183.
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On the other hand, Panel B-3 shows that Heir CEO × HHIt－1 does not 
have statistically meaningful coefficient values in column (1) and (2), 
whereas the interaction terms are positive at the 5% significance level 
in column (3) and (4). This suggests that heir CEOs do not seem to 
bring about additional positive impact in terms of accounting performance 
under weak product market competition, but investors perceive those 
firms with heir CEOs still to be more positive than nonfamily firms. 
Lastly, Panel B-4 contains the results of the analysis in which the 
family firms with professional CEOs are compared with nonfamily firms, 
and they show that Professional CEO × HHIt－1 has positive coefficients 
in all four models, confirming our earlier evidence. Taken as a whole 
and irrespective of whether the CEO is a founder, heir or hire, when 
compared to nonfamily firms we find family presence (maintaining in- 
fluence in the firm primarily through an equity stake or as a top level 
manager) generates significantly better accounting and stock market 
performances under weak product market competition.
   
B. Additional Tests
We then further analyzed amongst family firms whether the firm’s 
performance differs depending on CEO classification. These results are 
displayed in Table 5, and interestingly only β4 Founder CEO × HHIt－1 is 
shown to have positive coefficients in column (3) and (4), whereas β5 
Heir CEO × HHIt－1 is shown to have negative coefficients at the 5% 
significance level in column (5) and (6). 
Consequently, our additional test reveals that founder firms are signi- 
ficantly better performers in an environment with low levels of market 
competition, suggesting that founders can provide control and oversight 
that substitute for the disciplinary role of market pressure. On the other 
hand, heir firms demonstrate worse performance as the market compe- 
tition decreases, indicating that heirs exploit the lack of market pres- 
sure to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors.
C. Robustness
a) Alternative Measures of Product Market Competition
Table 6 contains robustness checks considering alternative measures 
of product market competition. For robustness checks, we used two 
alternative measures to proxy for product market competition. In Panel 
A of Table 6, we used a four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) based on 
the two-digit SIC industries and CR4, to calculate the sum of market 













































































































































































































































































Industry & Year 
control




























Note: This table reports the additional test that repeats the analysis within family firms using 
different CEO types. Refer to Table IV for the definitions of the other variables. The 
coefficients for the industry and year dummies are not reported for brevity. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively and throughout. White 
(1980)-corrected t-values appear in parentheses. 
TABLE 5  
ADDITIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS WITHIN FAMILY FIRMS
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ROBUSTNESS: ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF COMPETITION
Panel A: Using a Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4)
shares of the four largest firms in an industry.14 In Panel B, we used 
three-digit SIC industries to calculate HHI, referring to HHI3 in the 
actual model. As shown, we find qualitatively similar results with all 
three alternative competition measures. 
14 The four-firm concentration ratio indicates the degree to which an industry 
is oligopolistic and the extent of market control held by the four-largest firms in 
the industry.
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Note: This table reports the robustness test that repeats the analysis using 
alternative measures of product market competition. In Panel A, the HHI 
is replaced with the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), which is the sum 
of market shares of the four largest firms in an industry. In Panel B, 
three-digit SIC industries are used to calculate HHI, naming HHI3 in the 
actual model. Refer to Table IV for the definitions of the other variables. 
The coefficients on the industry and year dummies are not reported for 
brevity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 




Panel B: Using the HHI Based on Three Digit SIC Industries (HHI3)
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Variables
Lowest HHI Quintile Highest HHI Quintile


















































































ROBUSTNESS OF MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Panel A: Comparison between the Lowest and Highest HHI Quintile
b) Robustness of Model Specifications
We divided firms into quintiles by ranking firms according to their 
HHIs, and compared the regression results of the lowest and highest 
HHI quintile. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results, while columns (1) 
and (2) show the effect of family firms on operating and stock market 
performance in the lowest HHI quintile, i.e., more competitive industries. 
As can be seen, the coefficient of FAM is weakly significant at the 10% 
level only in operating performance, suggesting that overall performance 
of family firms is not significantly different from that of nonfamily firms 
in competitive industries. In columns (3) and (4), however, we find 
strong evidence that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms 
in terms of both accounting (ROA1) and market value (TQ) performance 
in highest HHI quintile, i.e. less competitive industries. Our evidence 
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Panel B: Using the Firm Clustering Regression
confirms the hypothesis that firms in noncompetitive industries benefit 
more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries, 
consistent with Giroud, and Mueller (2011).
In Panel B and C, two alternative econometric techniques were used 
that control for serial correlation within a firm across time. First, we 
used firm-level clustering regressions for any autocorrelation at the firm 
level (Huber 1967; Rogers 1983; Peterson 2009), and presented these 
results in Panel B. As shown, we find that the coefficient of interaction 
term FAM × HHI is still significantly positive in relation to both TQ and 
MTB, though the operating performance results lack statistical significance.
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Industry control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,637 10,637 10,637 10,637
Notes: Table 7 reports the robustness test that repeats the analysis using 
alternative econometric techniques that serve as a control for serial 
correlation. In Panel A, firms have been ranked into five groups 
according to their HHIs and the regression results of the lowest and 
highest HHI quintile are presented. In Panel B, firm-level clustering 
regressions have been used to adjust for standard errors, if there is an 
autocorrelation at the firm level. In Panel C, Fama-MacBeth regressions 
are used, meaning that cross-sectional regressions have been run 
separately for each year and the means of coefficients and standard 
errors have been obtained by using the Newey-West procedure (Newey 
and West, 1987). Refer to Table IV for the definitions of the variables. 
The coefficients on the industry and year dummies are not reported for 
brevity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 




Panel C: Using the Fama-MacBeth Regression and Newey West Adjustment 
for Standard Errors
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In Panel C, we use Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama, and MacBeth 
1973). That is, we run cross-sectional regressions (including dummy 
variables for first-digit SIC codes) separately for each year, and obtained 
the means of coefficients and standard errors using the Newey-West 
procedure (Newey, and West 1987). Overall, our estimates from Fama- 
MacBeth regressions are consistent with our prior OLS results, sug- 
gesting that family firms are superior performers in noncompetitive 
industries. 
VI. Conclusion
In this study, the level of product market competition is considered 
as a form of external corporate governance, and family ownership is 
considered as a form of internal corporate governance. We examined 
the effect of these two forms of governance on firm performance. The 
impact of product market competition on firm performance in firms 
with family control is our specific focus. Further, this study categorizes 
family firms with CEO classification (founders, heirs, and professional 
CEOs) and analyzes whether family firms have different impacts 
depending on the CEO type. 
The regression analysis reveals the following results. First, family 
firms perform better in terms of operating performance when the level 
of product market competition is low, which implies that the agency 
problem caused by weak external corporate governance is effectively 
mitigated by the controlling governance of family shareholders. Second, 
in terms of stock market performance, firm value is higher for family 
firms in noncompetitive industries, which suggests that the market re- 
cognizes and properly values the strength of the characteristics of family 
firms. Furthermore, the results of the analysis by family firms CEO 
types shows that the outstanding performances of family firms still hold 
regardless of their CEO types (founder / heir / professional CEO) when 
compared with nonfamily firms. 
For robustness checks, we use alternative measures to proxy for 
product market competition and apply alternative econometric techniques 
that control for serial correlation within a firm across time. The results 
from robustness checks are qualitatively consistent with our prior OLS 
results, suggesting that family firms are superior performers in non- 
competitive industries. 
Therefore, our evidence presented in this paper supports the hypothesis 
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that the interests of external minority shareholders and those of family 
shareholders coincide rather than infringing on one another. In addition, 
the strength of family firms is more pronounced when the level of product 
market competition is weak. Taken as a whole, family control is an 
effective internal corporate governance mechanism that compensates for 
weak external corporate governance, mitigates the agency problem, and 
ultimately has a positive impact on the firm.
This study contributes to the growing line of research on the relation 
between governance structure and product market competition. In sum, 
our results suggest that the efforts to improve corporate governance might 
focus primarily on managerial expropriation and opportunism under con- 
ditions of weak product market competition. We would like to extend a 
word of caution, however, that firm performance may be affected by 
other confounding corporate governance factors that are not considered 
in this study.
(Received 9 March 2015; Revised 1 March 2016; Accepted 23 March 
2016)
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